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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4103(2)G). This appeal was taken from an order of the district court granting
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, over which the Court of Appeals does
vii

not have original appellate jurisdiction, but the Utah Supreme Court transferred
the case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, by Order filed February 17, 2016 (R 1165). 1

V,

vl

1

All cites to the record herein are denoted by R page number.
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellant Candy Bahnmaier filed the instant action after Appellee St.
Mark's Hospital terminated her employment, claiming that she came to work
under the influence of drugs or alcohol on March 29, 2012. In fact, Bahnmaier
was not under the influence of anything. St. Mark's had a drug testing policy that
laid out very specific guidelines for drug testing its employees. But Bahnmaier
was not tested on the day in question and passed a drug test the following day.
Bahnmaier brought claims for breach of contract and negligence against St.
Mark's, and for defamation and intentional interference with economic relations
against St. Mark's and her supervisor, Renel Rytting. Defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment as to all of Bahnmaier' s claims, which the district court
granted.
The questions raised on this appeal are:
1.

Did the district court err in dismissing Bahnmaier' s contract and negligence

claims as a matter of law, or is there a question of fact as to whether the actions of
the decision-makers were reasonable?
2.

Did the district court err in dismissing Bahnmaier' s defamation and

intentional interference claims, or is there a question of fact as to whether
Rytting's claims that Bahnmaier was under the influence at work were made with
reckless disregard of the falsity of the statement.

4
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This court reviews a decision granting summary judgment "for correctness,
giving no deference to the trial court's decision." Reynolds v. Gentry Finance

Corporation, 2016 UT App 35,, 8.
Bahnmaier preserved her claims for appeal through her timely Notice of
Appeal, which states, "The appeal is taken from the entire judgment .... " R
1072.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff/Appellant Candy Bahnmaier was employed as a scrub technician
at St. Mark's Hospital for seven years. At the time of her termination in 2012,
Bahnmaier was not an "at will" employee. She had a signed agreement from St.
Mark's stating that she could only be terminated "for cause," and an employment
manual that stated she could only be terminated for a "valid reason." Contrary to
these assurances, Bahnmaier was terminated ostensibly for violating the
"Substance Use in the Workplace" policy on March 29, 2012, even though she
was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. It is undisputed that no one
smelled alcohol on Bahnmaier that day and she was not required to take a drug
test, and she passed a drug test she was required to take the following day. In an
email on March 30 that subsequently disappeared, Bahnmaier's supervisor,
Vii

Defendant/Appellee Renel Rytting, apparently claimed to Rytting's supervisor,
Corbie Petersen, that Bahnmaier was under the influence of drugs or alcohol on
March 29, leading ultimately to Bahnmaier's termination. In deciding to terminate
Bahnmaier, Petersen disregarded the hospital's own policies, procedures, and
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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practices by failing to do the most basic investigation; she did not speak to
Bahnmaier or any of her coworkers regarding the day in question, and apparently
did not question why Bahnmaier was not drug tested immediately. As such, St.
Mark's failed to take the most basic steps to determine whether Ms. Bahnmaier
actually violated its Substance Abuse Policy, and terminated her without any
reliable evidence that she had abused any substance. Therefore, there is, at a
minimum, a question of fact as to whether Bahnmaier was terminated "for cause"
pursuant to her agreement with St. Mark's, such that her claims should not have
been dismissed at summary judgment. There is also evidence from which a
reasonable juror could find that Rytting lied about Bahnmaier's condition on
March 29 with at least a reckless disregard for her statements' falsity; Bahnmaier' s
defamation claim therefore should also be remanded for a jury to determine.

6
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Candy Bahnmaier was hired by St. Mark's Hospital in July 2005 as a
surgical tech. R 3 0 2 ( 12: 19-21).
2. St. Mark's is owned and operated by Northern Utah Healthcare
Corporation, a subsidiary of Hospital Corporation of America
("HCA"). R 479.
"For Cause" Termination Policy:
3. When she was hired, Bahnmaier signed an Acknowledgement Card for
Vil

HCA' s Code of Conduct, which states, "I certify that I have received
the HCA Code of Conduct, understand it represents mandatory policies
of the organization and agree to abide by it." R 0256.
4. The Code of Conduct requires that employees follow St. Mark's policies. It
states, "[i]t is the responsibility of each individual to be aware of those
policies and procedures that pertain to his or her work and to follow those
policies and procedures." R 858 (Code of Conduct at p. 33.
5. All employees also receive a hard copy of the HCA "Healthy Work
Environment" manual. R 434 (23: 1-6).
6. The Healthy Work Environment manual assures employees of "fair
application of workplace polices, procedures, and disciplinary proceedings"
and explains HCA's "commitment to you today, tomorrow, and in the

~

future." R 807.
7
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7. The Healthy Work Environment manual states that employees'
"employment cannot be ended without a valid reason" and employees are

~

taught that this is the standard for their employment. R 435 (25: 10-22); R
811. This "for cause" employment standard was instituted in 2006. R 820.

~

8. St. Mark's issued employees another policy that defines its 'just cause"
standard as follows: "Cause is defined as a reason for disciplinary action
that is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, that is based on facts that the

~

employer reasonably believes to be true. Some examples of cause include,
but are not limited to, ( 1) dissatisfaction with an employee for such reasons

~

as lack of capacity or diligence, failure to conform to usual standards of
conduct, or other culpable or inappropriate behavior, or (2) economic
needs subject to the reasonable judgment of the employer." R 0258.

9. Bahnmaier also signed two agreements with St. Mark's reiterating that her
employment could only be terminated "for cause." On March 1, 2007, in

~

conjunction with a retention bonus paid to her by St. Mark's, Bahnmaier
signed a Retention Bonus Agreement which states: "It is understood that
~

all employment, including EMPLOYEE'S employment, with HOSPITAL
is for an indefinite term and is terminable for cause. Cause is defined as a
reason for disciplinary action that is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal,
that is based on facts that the employer reasonably believes to be true." R
0267.

Gui,

8
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10. In June 2008, St. Mar's created a dedicated Cardiovascular Heart Surgery
Team to handle all heart surgeries. Bahn.maier accepted a position as a
surgical tech on this Heart Team and signed a Cardiovascular Technician
Employee Agreement which contains the same provision regarding "for
cause" employment as the 2007 contract. R 0269-71.
11. Both the 2007 and 2008 agreements contain a clause stating, "Nothing in

this Agreement will be construed to obligate HOSPITAL to employ
EMPLOYEE for any particular time or under any particular terms or
~

conditions of employment." R 270 (emphasis added).
12. Bahnmaier was told that St. Mark's had to have a reason to terminate her
by her management and Human Resources, in addition to the written
policies. R 356 (227:9-18). She understood that St. Mark's followed a
progressive discipline policy that required a verbal warning, then a written
warning, then a final warning before a person could be terminated. R 356
(227: 19-228:14).

Drug and Alcohol Policy:
13. All St. Mark's employees, including management, are expected to follow
St. Mark's/HCA's policies. R 447 (74:23-75:9).
~

14. St. Mark's Code of Conduct provides that "all colleagues must report for
work free of the influence of alcohol and illegal drugs. Reporting to work
under the influence of any illegal drug or alcohol ... may result in

9
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immediate termination. We may use drug testing as a means of enforcing
this policy." R 288.
15. Employees are required to sign that they received a copy of the substance
and alcohol abuse policy. R 421.
16. In fact, the employment application Bahnmaier signed to apply for a job
with St. Mark's specifically states "compliance with the facility's
Substance Abuse Policy is a condition of employment." R 245.
17. Bahnmaier signed a document consenting to be drug tested in 2005, in
conjunction with receiving a copy of the Drug and Alcohol Policy. R 273.
18. St. Mark's Substance Use in the Workplace policy states that its purpose is
"[t]o articulate our intent that all conduct be consistent with all relevant
federal, state and local laws and regulations relating to drug or alcohol use
by employees." R 275.
19. The Substance Use in the Workplace policy outlines responsibilities of
both staff employees and management. R 276.
20. This policy states that it is management's responsibility to, among other
things:
•

"Inform employees of this policy;"

•

"Contract with an accredited reference lab for drug testing, transmit to the
lab a copy of this policy, and ensure that the lab has a physician who will
serve as a Medical Review Officer (MRO) for testing and interpretation;"
and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

•

"Investigate reports of reasonable suspicion of violations of this policy."

R276.
21. The policy prohibits employees from "reporting to work, or being at work,
with the smell of alcohol on one's breath or person, or a measurable
quantity of non-prescribed Controlled Substances in one's blood or urine"
and specifies that engaging in such activities "may lead to discipline, up to
and including immediate discharge." R 276-77.
22. The policy states, "[f]or the purpose of the Policy, an employee is presumed
to be under the influence of alcohol if a blood test or other scientifically
acceptable testing procedure shows a blood alcohol level of .04 or more."

R 276-77.
23. The policy also prohibits employees from being at work under the influence
of "prescribed or non-prescribed controlled substances," although
"[p]rescription medications are not prohibited under this policy when taken
as prescribed under the direction and monitoring of a physician." R 277.
(Jj)

24. The policy states, "[t]o ensure the accuracy and fairness of our testing
program, all collection and testing will be conducted pursuant to guidelines
established by the Medical Review Officers and, if applicable, in

~

accordance with Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration (SAMHSA) guidelines; a confirmatory test; the opportunity
for a split sample; review by an MRO, including the opportunity for
employees who test positive to provide a legitimate medical explanation,
11

(Jj)
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such as a physician's prescription, for the positive result; and a documented
chain of custody." R 278.
25. "Testing for the presence of alcohol will be conducted by analysis of
breath, saliva, blood or other accepted testing methodology." R 278.
26. The policies state, "[a]ny employee whose blood alcohol content exceeds
the maximum set forth in the policy, or test positive for non-prescribed
Controlled Substances or illegal substances, will be immediately
suspended. The Facility shall then seek legal review by the employment
section of the Legal Department." R 280.
27.Because "[c]ommunicating this policy is critical to the Company's
success," the policy requires that all employees receive the policy at
orientation and review it annually, and that staff managers also discuss the
policy during their orientation as managers. R 281.
28.Regarding the Substance Use in the Workplace Policy, Human Resources
has "a duty to determine if a policy's been violated" by gathering facts. R
437-438 (36: 11-3 7 :7).
I;

29. The same test is given to all employees suspected of violating the Drug and
Alcohol Policy. R 438 (40:6-8).
30. St. Mark's has an agreement with a drug screen company to come do a drug
test within an hour of being contacted by St. Mark's. R 440 (45:6-11).
31. St. Mark's made clear to its employees that any employee suspected of
being drunk at work would be drug tested. R 825.
12
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Bahnmaier's Termination:
32. The Executive Director of Surgical Services at the time of the events in
question was Corbie Peterson. R 407. Together with Bahnmaier's direct
supervisor, Renel Rytting, Peterson evaluated Bahnmaier in March 2012,

VJ

and documented that Bahnmaier was performing well. R 411 (25-27); 417
(52: 10-16).
33.As of March 2012, Rytting found Bahnmaier to be "generally dependable.
Usually prepared. Seemed to enjoy her job." R 386 (98:6-9). The only
~

concern Rytting had with Bahnmaier's performance was that Bahnmaier
had a tendency to become distracted, and sometimes disposed of items
before they were used up, but Rytting never wrote Bahnmaier up for this
issue because "talking was sufficient" to remedy the problem. R 386
(98: 10-99: 19).
34. Petersen had no concerns about Bahnmaier leading up to her termination.
R 418 (53:4-6). 2
3 5. On March 29, 2012, Bahnmaier agreed to cover a shift for another
employee. R 387 (102:6-8).
36. Bahnmaier arrived to work around 7:00 p.m. that day. R 392 (122:2-7).
During this litigation, St. Mark's suggested that Petersen was justified in
terminating Bahnmaier in April 2012 for violating the substance abuse policy
because Petersen had disciplined Bahnmaier a year earlier for drinking on a day
she was on call, but St. Mark's misrepresents the prior situation; on May 26, 2011,
Bahnmaier had originally been scheduled to be on call, but she found a coworker
to cover her call shift. It is undisputed that Bahnmaier did not work or attempt to
work that day. R 775.
13
2
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37. When Bahnmaier arrived to the hospital, Rytting was frustrated because of
what was already happening at work; because Bahnmaier had just arrived,
she did not know what was going on. R 316 (65:2-10). Rytting took her
frustration out by yelling at Bahnmaier when she first arrived about not
responding to a page, which caused Bahnmaier to start crying. R 316 (65 :215); 393 (126:2-7). Because she was crying, Bahnmaier's makeup smeared
and her eyes became red. Id; R 331 (125:16-20).
38. Bahnmaier's coworker, Beau Bensinger, interacted with Bahnmaier after
she arrived to work on March 29. R 825. He testified that "her eyes were
red, and she had obviously been crying, but there was no smell of alcohol,
and she was not slurring her words or doing anything that would make me
believe she was drunk." Id.
39.Rytting did not smell alcohol on Bahnmaier. R 0394 (131:9-11).
40. Nonetheless, Rytting claims to have believed Bahnmaier "was under the
influence of some substance." R 392 (124:21-25), 393 (125:10-19).
41. Rytting does not know what "substance" Bahnmaier might have been under
the influence of. R 379 (70: 12-20).
42. Rytting acknowledges she is not able to tell by looking at someone if they
are under the influence of alcohol or drugs. R 3 79 (71: 3-5).
43.Rytting was aware that St. Mark's could drug test its employees, and in
fact, she herself had been drug tested. R 3 79 (71 :20-72:2).

14
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~

44. Bahnmaier testified she took a diet pill on March 29, 2012 and informed
Rytting of this, but did not drink any alcohol that day. R 322 (91:20-22);
351 (207:5-208:4). In fact, Bahnmaier spent the day with her then-fiveyear-old daughter. R 322 (91 :20-21).
45.Bahnmaier testified she never did and never would not go into work under
the influence of drugs or alcohol. R 356 (226:6-227:8).
46. There are disputes of fact about much of the substance of the conversation
between Rytting and Bahnmaier after Bahnmaier arrived for work on the
evening at issue, but it is undisputed that Rytting did not require Bahnmaier
to take a drug test on March 29, 2012. Rytting claims that she asked
Bahnmaier to take a drug test, and Ms. Bahnmaier said she did not want to
and did not need to and that she was 'Just on energy pills." R 394 (132: 616). Rytting acknowledges that Bahnmaier denied being on any substance
that would make her unsafe to work. R 394 (129:6-25). Rytting claims she
did not believe Bahnmaier, and gave her the option of taking a drug test or
going home, and Bahnmaier opted to go home. R 394 (394:20-23).
47.Bahnmaier testified she never indicated to Rytting that she was unwilling
to take a drug test. R 358 (233:2-4). Bahnmaier also never seriously
indicated to Rytting that she was not sober or that she would not pass a
drug test. R 355-56 (224:16-225:2). (Bahnmaier testified that any thing
~

she might have said to the contrary would have been in a "smart aleck"
tone, but she does not recall saying something to that effect. R 320 (81: 1115
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

82: 16). Moreover, Bahnmaier insists that she would have passed a drug
test on March 29, 2012, had she been required to take one. R 356 (225:22226:7).
48. Rytting allowed Bahnmaier to drive home on March 29, 2012, and was not
concerned that she was unable to drive. R 399-400 (152:24-153:4).
49. The following day, Rytting alleged to Peterson that Bahnmaier "came to
work and was inebriated and unable to function." R 418 (R 418:8-23).
50. Petersen understood Rytting to be telling her that Bahnmaier was drunk on
alcohol. R 418-19 (56:24-57:3).
51.Petersen asked Rytting "to write an e-mail about it." R 418 (55:11-18). In
fact, an email from Rytting to Petersen on March 30, 2012 is referenced in
a follow-up email Rytting wrote on April 3, 2012: "I sent an email the next
day to you and HR to inform you ofmy actions." 293. The March 30, 2012
email was never produced in the litigation, however, and St. Mark's and
Rytting claimed during discovery that it disappeared. R 864.3
52. On March 30, 2012, Bahnmaier worked a full shift at Timpanogos Regional
Hospital, a sister hospital to St. Mark's. (St. Mark's and Timpanogos had

Later, Rytting claimed the April 3, 2012 email was the only communication
she had with anyone about the incident that led to Bahnmaier' s termination. R
397 (142:25-143:8). But April 3 is clearly not the first communication about
the March 29, 2012 incident because Bahnmaier was drug tested on March 30,
2012.
3

16
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an arrangement in which certain members of St. Mark's Heart Team took
shifts at Timpanogos as needed. R 4 77.)
53. Following her shift on March 30, Bahnmaier was asked to take a drug test,
~

which she did. R 419 (60:6-14).
54. The test came back negative. R 420 (64:2-5).
55. Nonetheless, Peterson terminated Bahnmaier on April 10, 2012 for
violating the "Substance Use in the Workplace" policy. R 418 (53:4-23).
56. Petersen acknowledges that generally, to determine if someone actually
engaged in substance abuse in the workplace, she would "interview people,
including the person that is alleged to be in violation." R 418 (54:12-55:6).
57. In Bahnmaier's situation, however, Petersen did not speak to Bahnmaier
about the allegations against her other than when she was terminating her.
R 418 (55:14-21).
58. Nor did Petersen speak to any of the other employees who were present the
night of March 29, 2012. R 420 (62:17-20).
59. Petersen did not even ask Rytting whether she or any witnesses smelled
alcohol on Bahnmaier. R 420 (63:2-8).
60. Petersen did not find out whether Rytting had someone drive Bahnmaier
home, but does not believe she did. R 419 (57:14-18); 420 (64:12-15).
61. Peterson expected that the test would come back negative. R 420 (64:2-5).
62. Other employees have been suspended based on suspicions that they were
under the influence of drugs at work, but were not disciplined until St.
17
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Mark's received confirmation. In one case, an ER nurse who was found to
be ingesting narcotics at work instead of disposing of them was only
written up, and was not terminated until several months later, after an
investigation showed she was continuing to help herself to narcotics at
work. R 1172-77.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Bahnmaier' s breach of contract claims were improperly dismissed because
there is a question of fact as to whether St. Mark's violated its policies and other
agreements with her by terminating her without drug testing her on the day in
question, despite her passing a drug test the following day, and without doing a
basic investigation into her condition on March 29, 2012.
Bahnmaier' s negligence claim was improperly dismissed because the
"economic loss" doctrine does not apply to employment cases.
Bahnmaier' s defamation claim (which the intentional interference claim
depends upon) was improperly dismissed because there is a question of fact as to
whether Rytting claimed Bahnmaier was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at
work with knowledge of the statement's falsity or reckless disregard of its falsity.

18
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ARGUMENT

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews a decision granting summary judgment "for correctness,

giving no deference to the trial court's decision." Reynolds v. Gentry Finance

Corporation, 2016 UT App 35, 18. The court must "view the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party." Id. (internal cites omitted).

II.

BAHNMAIER'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM: WAS
IMPROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE ST. MARK'S VIOLATED
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED TERMS OF ITS AGREEMENTS WITH

HER
It is undisputed that Babnmaier was not an "at will" employee; St. Mark's
promised Bahnmaier that she would only be terminated for a valid reason. In the
course of her employment, St. Mark's provided her with many policies, including
a Substance Abuse Policy, which set forth the specific guidelines St. Mark's
would follow when testing for drugs or alcohol, and assured her that St. Mark's
was committed to "fair application of workplace policies." St. Mark's terminated
e;j

Bahnmaier for violating the "Substance Use in the Workplace" policy, despite it
being undisputed that no one smelled alcohol on her and she was not required to
take a drug test on the day she is accused of being "under the influence," and
despite her having passed a drug test when she was required to take it the
following day. Bahnmaier alleges that St. Mark's actions in terminating her
violate its written and/or implied promises to her that it will adhere to its own
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policies, most particularly its drug testing policy, and only terminate her for a
valid reason. Her breach of contract claim should therefore be decided by a jury.

A.

Express Contract
Bahnmaier has an express agreement with St. Mark's that states that her

employment is "terminable for cause ... defined as a reason for disciplinary
action that is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, that is based on facts that the
employer reasonably believes to be true." R 266-67. St. Mark's argued at
summary judgment that Bahnmaier cannot show breach of contract because,
"Sound minds cannot differ on whether Ms. Peterson reasonably believed these
facts [that Ms. Bahn.maier violated Hospital polices and potentially put Hospital
patients at risk] to be true." The district court adopted this reasoning. Order
Granting Motion for Summary Judgment Filed by Defendants Northern Utah
Healthcare Corporation and Renel Rytting ("Order"), at~ 33. But whether a
party's actions "were reasonable is a question of fact." Jacob v. Bate, 2015 UT
App 206, 115. Under the facts oft his case, sound minds can certainly differ on
whether Petersen's purported belief that Bahnmaier was ''under the influence" was
reasonable.
First, it is undisputed that Rytting did not require Bahnmaier to take a drug
test on the day she is accused of being ''under the influence," as provided for in the
Substance Abuse Policy provided to all employees. A reasonable juror could
determine that this alone should call the reasonableness of Petersen's subsequent
termination decision into question. Further, in this day of electronic
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communication and in light of duties to preserve evidence, the disappearing email
from Rytting to Petersen on March 30 is at least suspect, and casts some doubt on
the Rytting's statement to Petersen and the legitimacy of any belief Petersen
gained from it. At any rate, despite having no objective evidence that Bahnmaier
was impaired on March 29, Petersen did no investigation regarding Bahnmaier's
condition. She did not speak to Bahnmaier or any of her coworkers who saw her
that night as was her regular practice in such situations; she did not inquire as to
whether anyone smelled alcohol on Bahnmaier, or whether Bahnmaier was able or
allowed to drive home. Such inquiry would be necessary to come to a reasonable
belief as to whether Bahnmaier violated the Hospital's Substance Use in the
Workplace policy. The policy prohibits coming to work smelling of alcohol, but
no one contends Bahnmaier smelled of alcohol that night. The policy does not
prohibit crying, or any other unusual behavior unless the conduct is the result of
her being under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Petersen could not possibly
have reasonable proof that Bahnmaier had a blood alcohol level of .04 or more, the
policy's presumed level constituting being "under the influence;" and the drug test
the following day showed as of that time, she had no drugs in her system.
Petersen's acceptance of the flimsiest of allegations against Bahmaier does not
\JP

represent a "reasonable belief' in them - certainly not as a matter of law.
Furthermore, Bahnmaier' s contract states she cannot be terminated for
arbitrary reasons, and she has evidence that her termination was arbitrary. Other
St. Mark's employees who were suspected of substance use in the workplace were
21
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not terminated, even with proof of such use. Bahnmaier has submitted the records
of two different employees under seal, one of whom was told that she was
suspended pending a drug screen, and if the screen was positive she would be
disciplined- as opposed to just being terminated despite a negative drug screen.
R 1172. A second employee (an ER nurse) was not terminated even after she
apparently took a narcotic at work instead of disposing of it and "[w ]ithin a short
period oftime your ability to perform your job was in question." R 1174. The ER
nurse was not terminated until an investigation months later showed discrepancies
in her narcotic use forms and she was seen going through the medication waste
bin. R 1176. This treatment is in sharp contrast to Bahnmaier's, who was
terminated on suspicion without any investigation and despite a negative drug
screen. This is the type of evidence that this court has found to raise a triable issue
of fact as to the intent behind an employer's actions. Reynolds v. Gentry Finance
Corporation, 2016 UT App 35, ilil 32-38. This evidence of pretext provides a
basis for a fact-finder to determine that Bahn.maier' s termination was not based on
a reasonable belief that she was abusing some substance and/or was arbitrary.
Because a reasonable juror could determine that Bahnmaier' s termination
was not based on good faith and/or was arbitrary, there is a question of fact as to
whether St. Mark's breached its "for cause" agreement with Bahnmaier.
Therefore, Bahnmaier's claim against St. Mark's for violating its express contract
with her should be remanded for trial by a jury.
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B.

Implied Contract
In addition to an express contract, St. Mark's also breached terms of an

implied contract with Bahnmaier, including the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing. 4 St. Mark's provided Bahnmaier with many documents, which she was
required to sign for, that provided policies that she and management were required
to abide by. In fact, St. Mark's concedes that abiding by the Substance Abuse
Policy was a condition of employment. R 217, ,I 3. That policy identified
management responsibilities including contracting with accredited labs for drug
testing and investigating reports of reasonable suspicions of violations of the
policy. St. Mark's also provided her with documents promising she would be
treated fairly. These policies created an implied agreement that she would be drug
tested to confirm any suspected drug or alcohol use at work, and that St. Mark's
would do an adequate investigation as opposed to terminating her for unfounded
suspicion. See, generally, Reynolds v. Gentry Finance Corporation, 2016 UT App
35.

"An implied contract may arise from a variety of sources including
personnel policies or provisions in an employment manual." Cabaness v. Thomas,
232 P.3d 486,502 (Utah 2010)."Ifthe presumption of at-will employment is
rebutted by the employer's policies and procedures, the discharged employee may

4

At summary judgment, St. Mark's only argument against Bahnmaier's claim for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim was based on an
argument that Bahnmaier was an "at-will" employee, which both parties agree is not
correct. See R 797.
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have a breach of implied contract claim according to the terms of that contract."
Watkins v. General Refractories Co., 805 F.Supp. 911, 914 (D. Utah 1992), citing
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 54 (Utah 1991). "Moreover, as implied
terms of the employment agreement, the employer must comply with the policy
manual's statements in good faith." Id.
An implied contract can be established by examining the employer's
communications with the employee, such as "the language of the manual itself, the
employer's course of conduct, and pertinent oral representations." Cabaness at
504. "Because '[t]he existence of [an implied contract] is [normally] a question of
fact which turns on the objective manifestations of the parties' intent,' it is
'primarily a jury question."' Cabaness at 503, citing Johnson v. Morton Thiokol,
818 P.2d 997, l00l(Utah 1991).

C.

District Court Errors
The district court erred in its analysis of Bahnmaier's contract claims in at

least two ways. First, the court determined that Bahnmaier' s claims failed in light
of the "clear and conspicuous" disclaimers St. Mark's included in the employment
application Bahnmaier signed and in the 2007 and 2008 agreements Bahnmaier
signed. Order, at 136. But the application Bahnmaier signed in 2005 was no
longer in effect at the time of Bahnmaier' s termination, as it stated that
Bahnmaier' s employment was "at will," and it is undisputed that beginning 2006,
St. Mark's adopted a "for cause" employment policy. As for the 2007 and 2008
agreements, the disclaimers in them specifically state that nothing in those
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agreements obligate St. Mark's to employ Bahnmaier under any particular terms
~

of employment, but do not disclaim contractual liability for all the policies
Bahnmaier was provided. It is undisputed that St. Mark's employees were given
copies of the policies and were expected to follow them. Given that the
employees had a "for cause" employment relationship with St. Mark's, they could
reasonably anticipate that both they and St. Mark's were bound to follow the
policies.
Second, the district court found that St. Mark's did not violate its drug
testing policy because "[t]esting under the policy was permissive and not
mandatory." Order, 137. Such a determination is not appropriate as a matter of
law, because a reasonable juror could determine that this interpretation was not the
intent of the parties. In Reynolds v. Gentry Finance Corporation, 2016 UT App
35, this court recently decided that the determination of what terms govern an
employee's employment must take into consideration the various documents
provided to an employee on a particular point. This court found that in Reynolds,
the inconspicuous disclaimer combined with other written assurances that
employees will not be retaliated against for making a complaint, created "a triable
issue of fact as to whether their disclaimers were sufficiently clear and conspicuous
to negate other terms of the manuals that purport to qualify Reynolds' s at-will
status." Reynolds, at ,r 22. Here, the "permissive" language regarding drug testing
in the Code of Conduct must be read in conjunction with the specific language in
the drug testing policy itself that sets for the standards St. Mark's agrees to abide
25
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by in drug testing.
The Code of Conduct does state, "We may use drug testing as a means of
enforcing this policy." R 288. This is apparently the language the district court
relied on to determine that the drug testing policy was permissive. But St. Mark's
also provided Bahnmaier with a separate "Substance Use in the Workplace" policy
that sets forth the standards St. Mark's will use in collecting samples and testing for
the presence of drug and alcohol, including abiding by the SAMHSA guidelines,
using a confirmatory test, providing for a split sample and review by a medical
review officer and "including the opportunity for employees who test positive to
provide a legitimate medical explanation, such as a physician's prescription, for the
positive result." R 278. Nowhere in the testing policies does St. Mark's suggest
that it can just skip the testing and terminate an employee based on suspicion of
drug or alcohol abuse. A reasonable juror could determine that given the
specificity of the testing criteria and St. Mark's stated purpose of"ensur[ing] the
accuracy and fairness of our testing program" (R 278), St. Mark's intended that if
an employee was suspected of drug or alcohol abuse and St. Mark's was
contemplating discipline or termination based on such suspicion, the employee
would be tested under these guidelines. At a minimum, reasonable minds could
differ regarding the district court's interpretation of St. Mark's policies as reflecting
the parties' intent to allow St. Mark's to choose between abiding by specific
standard guidelines or disregarding them altogether.
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ID.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING BAHNMAIER'S
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
Bahnmaier brought a negligence claim against St. Mark's because it

breached duties of care to her, including a duty to immediately drug test her if she
was legitimately suspected of being under the influence of alcohol and drugs, to
follow its own policies regarding drug testing, and to terminate her for a valid
reason only.
At summary judgment, St. Mark's argued that Bahnmaier's claim for
negligence is "foreclosed by the economic loss doctrine, which bars all tort claims
I.ii

seeking recovery for economic losses where the tort claims are not based on a duty
independent of the contractual obligations between the parties." R 224 (emphasis
~

added). The district court summarily adopted this argument. Order, 121. But the
doctrine simply does not apply here. "[T]he economic loss rule prevents parties

~

who have contracted with each other from recovering beyond the bargained-for
risks." Sunridge Development Corp v. RB&G Engineering, Inc., 230 P.3d 1000,
1006 (Utah 2010). The economic loss doctrine is not applicable in the context of
an employment case, in which a plaintiff alleges emotional distress damages in
addition to lost wages. See, e.g., Cabaness v. Thomas, 232 P.3d 486, 609 (Utah

2010) (holding plaintiff could proceed with claims against his employer for breach
of an implied contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress). Further, it
is not applicable when the dispute is over an implied contract, as is the case here
(see Breach of Contract section, above). As the Utah Supreme Court has
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explained:
The 'economic loss rule is the majority position that one may not
recover 'economic' losses under a theory of non-intentional tort. . ..
.Economic loss is defined as: '[D]amages for inadequate value, costs
of repair and replacement of the defective product, or consequent
loss of profits - without any claim of personal injury or damages to
another property ... as well as the "diminution in the value of the
product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the
general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold."'
American Towers Owners v. CCI Mechanical, 930 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Utah 1996)
(internal cites omitted).
In support of its theory regarding the economic loss rule, St. Mark's relied
upon several cases involving business disputes, including Davencourt at Pilgrims
Landing Homeowners Ass 'n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, L. C., 2009 UT
65. Regarding Bahnmaier's negligence claim, the district court based its decision
that it was barred by the economic loss rule on Davenport. Order, at 1 21. But
Davencourt is entirely inapplicable here, because it discusses the "economic loss
rule in the context of construction defect cases." 2009 UT 65, 118.
St. Mark's also cited at summary judgment to Anapoell v. American
Express Business Finance Corp., No. 2:07-cv-198-TC, WL 4270548 (D. Utah
Nov. 30, 2007). Anapoell is another business dispute case, involving a claim by a
doctor "that the Defendants, who lease medical equipment, have fraudulently
imposed charges on their equipment-lease customers ...." Language in the case
epitomizes why it is inapplicable here. As St. Mark's pointed out, the court in
Anapoell held, "Because Dr. Annapoell alleges only economic losses and has not
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alleged a duty independent of the Agreement, the economic loss doctrine bars his
~

tort causes of action." Id. at * 7. But Bahnmaier has not alleged only economic
losses, and her employment case is not analogous to a case about leasing medical
equipment. Similarly, St. Mark's reliance on Associated Diving and Marine

Contractors, LC v. Granite Construction Co. is misplaced, because the court in
that case reasoned, "because the harm ... is fully covered by the contract, it does
not give rise to an independent action in tort." No. 2:0l-cv-330, 2003 WL
25424908, (D. Utah 2003). These cases are inapplicable where emotional distress
damages are alleged.
None of the case law to which St. Mark's (or the district court) cite
involves employment cases. Bahnmaier has alleged that she has suffered from
emotional distress damages, not "only economic losses." See R 16; R 869.
Accordingly, Bahnmaier's claims are not guided by the "economic loss rule," and
there is no applicable authority supporting the district court's determination that
her negligence claims were barred by the doctrine.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING BABNMAIER'S
DEFAMATION CLAIM BECAUSE THERE IS A QUESTION OF
FACT AS TO WHETHER RYTTING LIED WITH KNOWING OR
RECKLESS DISREGARD OF HER STATEMENT'S FALSITY
Bahn.maier alleges that Rytting is liable to her for defamation, because

Rytting's claim "that Bahnmaier came to work appearing to be 'on something'"
caused Bahnmaier to suffer damages including economic losses and "emotional
pain and suffering." R 13 at ,r,r 29-33. "[A]n action for defamation is intended to
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protect an individual's interest in maintaining a good reputation." West v.

Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994). Rytting and St. Mark's
acknowledge that Rytting's statement to Corbie Peterson that "Candy came to
work intoxicated on March 29, 2012" caused Bahnmaier's termination. See R
457-59. Such a statement is defamation per se, particularly given Bahnmaier's
profession working in a hospital with heart patients, as it is a "charge of conduct
that is incompatible with the exercise of a lawful business," and arguably a
"charge of criminal conduct." Allred v. Cook, 590 P .2d 318, 320 (Utah 1979); see

also, Williams v. Fedex Corporate Services, Case No. 2:13-cv-37-TS (D. Utah
August 21, 2013). The district court found, however, that Rytting's
communication was privileged, and therefore not actionable unless Bahnmaier
could show that "Rytting abused the privilege by either: (1) making a statement
that Rytting knew was false or (2) making a statement with reckless disregard as to
its falsity." Order, ,r 24, citing Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 221 P.3d 205,
214-215 (Utah 2009). The district court found that Bahnmaier could not meet this
burden because "Rytting testified that Bahnmaier told her that she would fail a
drug test. Importantly, Bahnmaier admits that she could have made a remark that
gave Rytting the impression that Bahnmaier would fail a drug test." Order, 125.
This is an inaccurate portrayal of the facts as presented by Bahnmaier, however,
and the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to her.
Bahnmaier testified in her deposition (taken in April 2015) that she no
longer remembered the precise conversation she had with Rytting on March 29,
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2012. R 351 (207:8-13). She testified that she definitely did not tell Rytting that
she would not pass a drug test because that would not have been true. R 320
(81: 10-20). Bahnmaier then explained that she is "a big smart aleck" and
suggested she could have made a smart aleck remark to Rytting during the
conversation, but she did not recall the conversation. R 320 (81:21-82:10).
Bahnmaier did not concede that she said anything that legitimately would have
given Rytting the impression that she would not pass the drug test; rather,
Bahnmaier (who obviously cannot know how Rytting interpreted what she said)
simply said that if Rytting was under the impression that Bahnmaier was under the
influence of some substance, Rytting had an obligation to have Bahnmaier submit
to a drug test then. R 320 (82:7-10) ("And ifl did give her that impression, then in
a professional and a management role, then you go down and test. If there's any
suspicion, you do it. But that was not taken.")
Here, there is evidence that, despite her later claims that she understood
Bahnmaier to be saying she would not pass a drug test, Rytting made the statement
to Petersen on March 30 that Bahnmaier had been under the influence of
something the day before in reckless disregard of its falsity. First, there is the
suspicious disappearance of the email from Rytting to Petersen on March 30, so it
is not clear exactly what R ytting said, although it is undisputed that she said
something indicating that Bahnmaier had been under the influence of something
the day before. Further, at least one person who spoke to Bahnmaier on March 29
testified he could not smell alcohol on her, Rytting admits she did not smell
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alcohol on Bahnmaier, and no other employees provided evidence that Bahnmaier
smelled of alcohol that evening. In fact, Rytting let Bahnmaier drive home that
evening, and was not concerned about her ability to drive. A responsible adult,
which Rytting presumably is, would not let a drunk employee drive home. Thus,

~

there is a question of fact as to whether Rytting made the statement to Petersen
that Bahnmaier was intoxicated knowing it to be false.
Assuming Rytting really suspected Bahnmaier of being under the influence
of drugs or alcohol on March 29, she had an obligation to test her then. All
employees are trained on the Substance Use in the Workplace Policy; Rytting
herself had been drug tested. Rytting admits that she is not able to tell by looking
at someone whether they are under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Thus, the
only way to confirm her suspicions that Bahnmaier was under the influence of
anything improper would have been to send her for a drug test then. There is
simply no legitimate reason for Rytting not to have tested her at the time if she felt
that Bahnmaier was truly intoxicated or under the influence of something.
Finally, Rytting claims that although she was aware Bahnmaier was drug
tested following her report of the incident, she never knew the results of the test.
R 396 (137:18-138:7). The fact that she never even bothered to find out the results,
assuming that is true (albeit difficult to believe), suggests a reckless disregard for
the truth that shows an abuse of the privilege. See Williams v. FedEx Corp.

Services, No. 2:13-cv-37, 2013 WL 4500431 (D. Utah Aug. 21, 2013) (plaintiff's
defamation claim survived summary judgment because he alleged he claimed and
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~

provided documentation that he was not an illegal drug user, but the defendant told
~

others he tested positive for drugs.)
Based on these facts, there is at least a question of fact as to whether
Rytting informed Petersen that Bahnmaier came to work intoxicated knowing that
it was false, or told her in reckless disregard of the statement's falsity. Therefore,
Bahnmaier' s defamation claim should be remanded for determination by a jury.

vjp

V.

THE IMPROPER :MEANS PRONG OF THE INTERFERENCE
CLAIM SURVIVES BECAUSE OF THE DEFAMATORY
STATEMENT

Bahnmaier brought a claim against St. Mark's and Rytting for intentional
interference with economic relations based on Rytting's false claim that
Bahnmaier came to work under the influence of drugs or alcohol. R 13. The Utah
Supreme Court has made clear that a claim for intentional interference with
economic relations claim requires a showing that a defendant interfered with the
plaintiffs economic relations "through an improper means." Eldridge v.

Johndrow, 2015 UT 21. Bahnmaier acknowledges that the viability of her
intentional interference claim rests on the viability of her defamation claim, as
Bahnmaier alleges the "improper means" prong of the claim is met by the
defamatory statement.
As St. Mark's and Renel pointed out at summary judgment, the plaintiff's
interference claim in Eldridge was dismissed because his defamation claim failed,
v,

so there was no support for the improper means prong. But Bahnmaier' s case is
distinguishable from Eldridge, where the district court determined that the
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information at issue in the defamation claim "was 'at least substantially true' and
'not susceptible to a defamatory interpretation."' Id. at ,r 9. Because the
intentional interference claim was dependent upon a defamatory statement to
support the improper means prong, that claim was dismissed. Id. Here, however,
the statement that Bahnmaier came to work drunk or under the influence of drugs
was not true, and Rytting either knew the statement was false or showed reckless
disregard for its falsity. Accordingly, Bahnmaier's defamation claim survives
summary judgment, and therefore, her intentional interference claim does, too.

CONCLUSION
St. Mark's terminated Bahnmaier, a "for cause" employee, based on a
supervisor's unsubstantiated claim that she came to work under the influence of
drugs or alcohol. In light of St. Mark's promise to Bahnmaier that she could only
be terminated for a valid reason, and its policy setting forth specific guidelines it
will follow in drug testing, its termination of her even though she passed a drug
test the following day is a breach of its promises and its duties to her. Further, her
supervisor's unsubstantiated statements that she was under the influence, which
clearly caused her termination, were made with reckless disregard as to the truth
about her condition. Accordingly, Bahnmaier respectfully requests that this court
remand all of her .claims for trial to a jury.
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ADDENDUM

District Court's Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment Filed by
Defendants Northern Utah Healthcare Corporation and Renel Rytting, dated
December 28, 2015
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IN THE TIDRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY - WEST JORDAN, STATE OF UTAH

CANDIDA ("CANDY") S.
BAHNMAIER,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED BY DEFENDANTS NORTHERN
UTAH HEALTHCARE CORPORATION

AND RENEL RYTTING

v.
NORTHERN UTAH HEALTHCARE
CORPORATION, dba ST. MARK'S
HOSPITAL, a corporation; RENEL
RYTTING, an individual; and HOSPITAL
CORPORATION OF AMERICA, a
corporation,

Case No. 140401429

Judge James Gardner

Defendants.

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Northern Utah Healthcare
Corporation, dba St. Mark's Hospital (the "Hospital"), and Renel Rytting (collectively referred
to as "Defendants") came before the Court for oral argument on November 17, 2015. At the
hearing, Defendants were represented by Mark D. Tolman of Jones Waldo Holbrook and
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McDonough, P.C. and Plaintiff was represented by April L. Hollingsworth and Ashley F.
Leonard of Hollingsworth Law Office, LLC. After considering the undisputed evidence, hearing
arguments from counsel, and being fully advised, the Court issued a detailed ruling from the
bench on November 17, 2015 granting Defendants' Motion, a ruling incorporated herein by
reference. The Court now enters the following summary of relevant undisputed material facts,
conclusions of law, and judgment reflecting and supporting its ruling:

SUMMARY OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1. Plaintiff Candida Bahnmaier was hired by the Hospital on July 11, 2005 as an
operating room technician. (Plaintiffs Depo. 12:19-21, 15:1-4; Petersen Depo. 33:18-20.)
2. The Hospital's employment application signed by Bahnmaier in 2005 provides the
following disclaimer: "I understand and agree that any employee handbook which I may receive
will not constitute an employment contract but will be merely a gratuitous statement of Facility
policies." (Plaintiffs Depo. 14:23-25; Defendants' Exhibit 1.)
3. Sometime between Plaintiffs hiring in July of 2005 and February of 2007, the
Hospital adopted a "for cause" model into its at-will employment right to terminate with or
without cause. That Policy defines the "for cause" standard as follows: "Cause is defined as a
reason for disciplinary action that is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, that is based on facts that
the employer reasonably believes to be true. Some examples of cause include, but are not limited
to, ( 1) dissatisfaction with an employee for such reasons as lack of capacity or diligence, failure
to conform to usual standards of conduct, or other culpable or inappropriate behavior." (Petersen
Depo. 70:5-19; Defendants' Exhibit 5.)
4. On March 1, 2007, in conjunction with a retention bonus paid to her by the Hospital,
Plaintiff signed a Retention Bonus Agreement which states: "It is understood that all
employment, including EMPLOYEE'S employment, with HOSPITAL is for an indefinite term
and is terminable for cause. Cause is defined as a reason for disciplinary action that is not
arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, that is based on facts that the employer reasonably believes to be
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true. Nothing in this Agreement will be construed to obligate HOSPITAL to employ
EMPLOYEE for any particular time or under any particular terms or conditions of employment."
(Plaintiff's Depo. 38:20-24; Defendants' Exhibit 6.)
5. In June of2008 the Hospital created a dedicated Cardiovascular Heart Surgery Team
to handle all heart surgeries whether scheduled or unplanned emergency situations. Plaintiff
accepted a position as a member of this Heart Team and signed a Cardiovascular Technician
Employee Agreement which provides: "It is understood that all employment, including
EMPLOYEE'S employment, with HOSPITAL is for an indefinite term and is terminable for
cause. Cause is defined as a reason for disciplinary action that is not arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal, that is based on facts that the employer reasonably believes to be true. Nothing in this
Agreement will be construed to obligate HOSPITAL to employ EMPLOYEE for any particular
time or under any particular terms or conditions of employment." (Plaintiffs Depo. 46: 16-22;
Defendants' Exhibit 7.)
6. The Hospital has a longstanding Substance Use in the Workplace Policy (the
"Substance Use policy"). The Substance Use policy prohibits employees from being under the
VI

influence of alcohol while at work. Although drug testing "may" be used under this policy, drug
testing is not mandatory. (Plaintiffs Depo. 31:1-11; Brimhall Depo. 37:8-9; Admission
Response No. 5; Defendants' Exhibits 8-10.)
7. On May 26, 2011, Bahnmaier's supervisor, Corbie Peterson, issued a written warning
to Bahnmaier for her first violation of the Substance Use policy. Bahnmaier was told that
"further events will result in additional disciplinary action up to and including termination."
(Petersen Depo. 29:23-31:5; Admission Response No. 4; Defendants' Exhibit 11.)
8. On March 29, 2012, Bahnmaier agreed to cover an on-call shift originally assigned to
one of her co-workers. An unscheduled emergency open heart surgery case arose necessitating
the calling in of the Heart Team members who were on-call that day. Bahnmaier reported to the
Hospital at approximately 7:00 pm that evening to fill the call-in and work as part of the surgical

t.;j)
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team on the open heart surgery. (Plaintiff's Depo. 61:6- 63:14, 68:25 - 69:2; Defendants'
Exhibits 12 & 13.)
9. When Bahnmaier arrived for work that evening, her supervisor, Defendant Renel
Rytting, observed and "felt [Bahnmaier] was under the influence of some substance." (Rytting
Depa. 124:21-25, 125:10-19; Defendants' Exhibit 12; Plaintiff's Depo. 64:24- 65:17.)
10. One ofBahnmaier's co-workers also reported to Rytting that Bahnmaier's behavior
was similar to the conduct he had observed from her during off-duty social gatherings where she
had been drinking alcohol. (Affidavit of Rodney Shay Thompson; Rytting Depo. 127:22128:9.)
11. On March 29, 2012, Rytting met with Bahnmaier to ask if she was sober. Rytting
gave Bahnmaier the option of taking a drug test or going home. Rytting believes that Bahnmaier
replied, "I won't pass the test, I know I won't." (Rytting Depo. 129:3 - 132:23, 134:20 - 135:4;
Exhibit 12.)
12. Although Bahnmaier claims that she did not intend to tell Rytting that she would have
failed a drug test, Bahnmaier admits that she "could" have made a "smart aleck" remark that
gave Rytting the impression that Bahnmaier would have failed a drug test. (Plaintiff's Depo.
81:10 to 83:3.)
13. Throughout Rytting's conversation with Bahnmaier, Bahnmaier kept her surgical
mask in place covering her mouth and was chewing tobacco. (Plaintiff's Depo. 74:5-25; Rytting
Depo. 130:17-18, 131:10-11.)
14. Rytting told Peterson and a Human Resources employee, Brian Wood, about her
~

meeting with Bahnmaier that had occurred on March 29, 2012, including that Bahnmaier told
Rytting that she (Bahnmaier) would not pass a drug test. Rytting did not share the details of the
matter with anyone other than Petersen and Wood. (Rytting Depo. 55:8-18, 134:14-18, 138:1214; Defendants' Exhibit 12; Petersen Depo. 11: 16 - 12:5, 14:5 - 15:9; Plaintiff's Depa. 126:224, 143:21 - 144:4.)
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15. On March 30, 2012, Bahnmaier worked at Timpanogos Hospital, an affiliated
hospital. During that day, Robyn Opheikens, Human Resources Director for St. Mark's Hospital,
contacted Kelly Brimhall, Human Resources Director for Timpanogos Hospital, to arrange for a
drug test of Bahnmaier. Brimhall had never met Bahnmaier and Opheikens did not explain the
circumstances that led to her request for a blood test. (Brimhall Affidavit, 112-4.)
16. While waiting for the drug testing company to arrive, Brimhall and Bahnmaier
engaged in conversation. Brimhall told Opheikens that Bahnmaier told him that by the time she
was asked to cover a coworker's on-call shift on March 29, 2012, "she was drunk." Brimhall
further reported that Bahnmaier "admitted to being called in for a case and showing up drunk to
the case and having her supervisor realize that she was drunk ...." (Exhibit 13; Affidavit of
~

Kelly Brimhall; Brimhall Depo. 52:5-6, 55:1-3, 56:13-23, 58:2-9, 61:21 -62:6.)
17. Opheikens shared the information she received from Brimhall with Peterson.
(Petersen Depo. 81:3-23; Defendants' Exhibit 14.)
18. Bahnmaier admits that she cannot actually remember the details of her conversation
with Brimhall "at all" and, as a result, Bahnmaier would not say that he lied about anything he
reported about her. (Plaintiffs Depo., pp. 88:1-8, 95:14-23, 226:8 to 227:4.)
19. On April 10, 2012, in light of the prior written warning and the independent reports
from Rytting and Brimhall, which Peterson testified, she believed to be true, Petersen decided to
terminate Plaintiffs employment with St. Mark's Hospital. (Petersen Depo. 57:5-13, 81:3-23;
Petersen Affidavit; Defendants' Exhibit 14.)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM.
20. Bahnmaier alleges that the Defendants acted negligently when they did not send
Bahnmaier for a drug test under the Hospital's Substance Use policy. See Complaint, ,,r 21-23.
Bahnmaier further alleges that the Hospital acted negligently when it allegedly did not abide "by
the policy of requiring a valid reason for terminating an employee" when it terminated
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Bahnmaier's employment. Id. at 124.
21. The Court finds that Bahnmaier' s negligence claim is barred by the economic loss
rule because she has not alleged a duty independent of any alleged contractual obligation. See

Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass 'n v. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC,
2009 UT 65, ml 18-19, 221 P.3d 234,242 (economic loss rule bars tort claims when there is no
duty independent of any contractual obligation). As a result, the negligence claim must be
dismissed.
22. In the alternative, as explained in paragraphs 31-37 below, the Court finds that a trier
of fact could not reasonably find that Defendants breached any possible duty to Bahnmaier that
may have arisen from the Hospital's Substance Use policy and its "for cause" employment
termination policy, and thus summary judgment is granted for this additional reason.

I. PLAINTIFF'S DEFAMATION CLAIM
23. The parties agree that a qualified privilege extends to the statements by Rytting that
are at issue in this case, including Rytting's statement that Bahnmaier admitted that she would
have failed a drug test, which statements were reported only to Rytting's supervisor (Peterson)
and an HR Manager (Wood). See Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991) ("qualified
privilege protects an employer's communication to employees and to other interested parties
concerning the reasons for an employee's discharge.").
24. To overcome this qualified privilege, Bahnmaier bears the burden of demonstrating
that Rytting abused the privilege by either: (1) making a statement that Rytting knew was false or
(2) making a statement with a reckless disregard as to its falsity. See Ferguson v. Williams &

Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, 1128-30, 221 P.3d 205, 214-215. The Court finds that Bahnmaier has
failed to meet her burden to show that Rytting abused the qualified privilege.
25. Rytting testified that Bahnmaier told her that she would fail a drug test. Importantly,
Bahnmaier admits that she could have made a remark that gave Rytting the impression that
Bahnmaier would fail a drug test. On these undisputed facts, the Court finds that Bahnmaier
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cannot make a showing, and that no trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Rytting
knowingly or recklessly made a false statement about her. As a result, summary judgment is
granted on the defamation claim.
26. Bahnmaier attempts to create an issue of fact by raising concerns about the adequacy
ofRytting's investigation. However, such concerns about the adequacy ofRytting's investigation
do not satisfy the standard of abuse required to overcome the qualified privilege. See Ferguson,
2009 UT 49, at ,I 33,221 P.3d at 216.

I. PLAINTIFF'S INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS CLAIM.
27. Bahnmaier's claim for intentional interference with economic relations is based on
the same alleged facts that make up her claim for defamation. See Complaint, ,I,I 34-40. The
parties agree, and Plaintiff conceded at oral argument, that to the extent Bahnmaier' s defamation
claim fails, Bahnmaier's claim for intentional interference with economic relations also fails.
28. Thus, because the Court has found that Bahnmaier's defamation claim fails, the Court

finds that summary judgment also is granted on the claim for intentional interference with
economic relations.

I. PLAINTIFF'S BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING CLAIM.
29. Bahnmaier' s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
identical to her claim for breach of contract. See Complaint, ,nf 43, 51. Under Utah law, a claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "has nothing to do with the
enforcement" of alleged express contract terms. See Zisumbo v. Ogden Regional Medical Center,
No. 1:10-cv-73, 2013 WL 1194717, *10-11 (D. Utah March 22, 2013). "Instead, as distinguished
from express terms, the covenant 'is based on judicially recognized duties not found within the
four comers of the contract."' Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, because Bahnmaier has only
alleged a breach of alleged express or implied contract terms, her claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails and must be dismissed.
30. In the alternative, the Court finds that the implied covenant of good faith and fair
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dealing cannot be contrary to the express terms of the parties' agreement. See Smith v. Grand

Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ,r 22, 84 P .3d 1154, 1160 ("The reach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing extends no further than the purposes and express terms of
the contract."). For the reasons stated in paragraphs 31-37 below, the Court finds that a trier of
fact could not reasonably conclude that the Hospital breached any of the alleged contract terms.
Accordingly, there can be no violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and
summary judgment is granted for this additional reason.

I. PLAINTIFF'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM.
31. The first part of Bahnmaier' s breach of contract claim concerns the Hospital's alleged
breach of its "for cause" termination policy. See Complaint, ,r,r 50-51.
32. There is no dispute about the language of the "for cause" termination policy at the
Hospital: "Cause is defined as a reason for disciplinary action that is not arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal, that is based on facts that the employer reasonably believes to be true."
33. The Court finds that the Hospital did not breach its "for cause" termination policy.
Peterson has testified that she believed that Bahnmaier had violated the Substance Use policy.
Bahnmaier has not raised a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Peterson's belief in
this regard was unreasonable. It is undisputed that (1) Peterson had already warned Bahnmaier
once for a violation of the Substance Use policy, (2) Peterson received independent reports about
further misconduct from Rytting (who reported that Bahnmaier had admitted that she would fail
a drug test) and from Brimhall (who reported that Bahnmaier had admitted to being under the
influence of alcohol at work), and (3) Bahnmaier admits that she could have made a remark to
Rytting that gave Rytting the impression that Bahnmaier would fail a drug test and admits that
she cannot testify that Brimhall lied about what he reported and thus she cannot contradict
Brimhall's testimony.
34. For all these reasons, the Court concludes that a trier of fact could not reasonably
conclude that Peterson did not reasonably believe that Bahnmaier had violated the Substance Use
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policy. Particularly in light of the nature ofBahnmaier's work on a heart surgery team, the Court
also finds that a trier of fact could not reasonably conclude that Peterson's decision to terminate
Bahnmaier's employment for that reason was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. As a result,
summary judgment is granted on the portion of Bahnmaier' s breach of contract claim that is
based on the Hospital's "for cause" termination policy.
35. The second part ofBahnmaier's breach of contract claim concerns the Hospital's
alleged breach of its Substance Use policy. Bahnmaier alleges that this policy was breached
when the Hospital did not require that she submit to a drug test. See Complaint, ,r,r 50-51.
36. The Court finds that the Hospital clearly and conspicuously disclaimed contractual
liability for its Substance Use policy in its employment application signed by Bahnmaier (which

ca

disclaimed that "any employee handbook which I may receive will not constitute an employment
contract"), and in its March 2007 Retention Bonus Agreement signed by Bahnmaier and its June
2008 Cardiovascular Technician Employee Agreement signed by Bahnmaier (which both
disclaim contractual liability and clearly state that the Hospital was not obligated to employee
Bahnmaier "under any particular terms or conditions of employment"). See Tomlinson v. NCR

Corporation, 2014 UT 55, ,I 25, 345 P.3d 523, 529 (a "clear and conspicuous disclaimer, as a
matter of law, prevents employee manuals or other like material from being considered as
implied-in-fact contract terms"). As a result, summary judgment is granted on the portion of

vb

Bahnmaier's breach of contract claim that is based on the Hospital's Substance Use policy.
3 7. In the alternative, the Court finds that even if the Hospital had not disclaimed
contractual liability for its Substance Use policy, summary judgment is still granted on this
portion of the breach of contract claim because there has been no breach of this policy. Testing
under the policy was permissive and not mandatory.
38. The Court also finds, in the alternative, that Bahnmaier's breach of contract claims
fail and summary judgment is granted because the Hospital at least substantially complied with
the purposes of its "for cause" termination policy and its Substance Use policy. See Piacitelli v.
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Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Utah 1981) (alleged breach of an
employment policy is measured against a "substantial compliance" standard).

I. PLAINTIFF'S PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIM
39. The Court fmds that because all ofBahnmaier's tort claims fail, her claim for punitive
damages must also be dismissed.

JUDGMENT
Based on the undisputed facts and the foregoing conclusions of law, and for the reasons
stated in Defendants' Motion and supporting papers and in the Court's ruling from the bench on
November 17, 2015, the Court hereby enters its final judgment in favor of Defendants Northern
Utah Healthcare Corporation, dba St. Mark's Hospital, and Renel Rytting and against Plaintiff
Candida Bahn.maier. The Court ORDERS that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED and Plaintiffs' Complaint against them is hereby DISMSSED WITH PREJUDICE.

END OF ORDER

EXECUTED AND ENTERED BY THE COURT AS INDICATED BY THE DATE AND
SEAL AT THE TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE
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